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ABSTRACT
The current framework of Internet interconnections, based
on transit and settlement-free peering relations, has systemic
problems that often cause peering disputes. We propose
a new techno-economic interconnection framework called
Nash-Peering, which is based on the principles of Nash Bar-
gaining in game theory and economics. Nash-Peering con-
stitutes a radical departure from current interconnection prac-
tices, providing a broader and more economically efficient
set of interdomain relations. In particular, the direction of
payment is not determined by the direction of traffic or by
rigid customer-provider relationships but based on which AS
benefits more from the interconnection. We argue that Nash-
Peering can address the root cause of various types of peer-
ing disputes.
1. INTRODUCTION
The tussle between content and access providers has
led to interest from techologists and policy makers in
the bargaining, money flow, and market power issues
behind Internet interconnections [12]. Peering disputes
over traffic imbalances are not new – several such in-
cidents between large ISPs and content providers have
happened over the years [1]. More recently however,
such disputes have been fueled by exploding demand
for streaming video, and growing concentration of con-
tent among a few providers and CDNs, raising questions
about appropriate network management, interconnec-
tion business strategies, and the impact of these peering
disputes on end-user performance [7].
An important point about the aforementioned peer-
ing disputes is that, while they result in performance
degradation, they are mostly economic issues. The tech-
nical solutions are straightforward – increase the capac-
ity of the network (or shift traffic to other routes) as
demand increases. The key questions, however, relate
to which party should pay for infrastructure upgrades
and how the costs and benefits of interdomain relation-
ships should be split among the different parties.
The current interconnection framework is predomi-
nantly based on two types of bilateral relations between
Autonomous Systems (ASes): transit and settlement-
free Peering (sf-Peering) [14]. In transit relations, the
provider advertises global Internet routes to the cus-
tomer, while the latter pays based on the traffic that
it sends/receives. In sf-Peering, there is no exchange
of money and each AS only exports routes that origi-
nate from itself and from its customer-cone. The condi-
tions for establishing an sf-Peering relation depend on
the business profile of the corresponding ASes. For in-
stance, content providers tend to peer openly (to mini-
mize their transit fees), while transit providers are more
selective, aiming to not peer with ASes that may be-
come their customers in the future [18]. Other types of
relations include paid-peering (similar to sf-Peering but
one of the two peers gets a traffic-dependent payment
from the other) and partial transit (where only some
routes are advertised from the provider to the customer)
[11].
Our main premise is that the currently deployed in-
terconnection framework has fundamental weaknesses
and systemic problems that will continue causing peer-
ing disputes. One such weakness is that sf-Peering rela-
tionships are formed for reasons (e.g., a balanced traffic
ratio) that are often only indirectly related to the costs
and benefits of the interconnection [27]. Consequently,
some interconnections may not be formed even when
they can result in both bilateral and Internet-wide ben-
efits. Instead of looking at each peering conflict as an
isolated incident, we need to focus on the limitations of
the interconnection framework that is generating these
disputes.
In this paper, we propose a new interconnection paradigm
that we refer to as Nash-Peering because it is based on
the principles of Nash Bargaining in game theory and
economics. Nash-Peering constitutes a radical depar-
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ture from today’s interconnection practices, providing
a broader and more economically efficient set of inter-
domain relations. In particular, a Nash-Peering inter-
connection is established if and only if it is beneficial
for both parties. Additionally, the direction of pay-
ment is not determined by the direction of traffic or
by rigid customer-provider relationships but based on
which AS benefits more from the interconnection. We
argue that Nash-Peering can address the root cause of
various types of peering disputes. We finally discuss
how the Internet can transition to Nash-Peering.
2. NASH-PEERING
2.1 Overview of Nash bargaining
Alice and Bob negotiate how to split a hidden trea-
sure of value V . Each of them has some information
about the treasure’s location and they can only find it
if they agree on how to split V . To recover the trea-
sure each of them will have to spend all their savings:
Alice has sA and Bob has sB. Obviously, they will be
interested in the treasure only if sA + sB < V . If they
agree, each of them will get a share, say vA and vB re-
spectively, with vA + vB = V . Otherwise, if they do
not reach agreement, they will stay with their savings
sA and sB; this is their “outside option” (also referred
to as disagreement or threat point).
If they reach an agreement, their cumulative benefit
or surplus is ∆ = V − (sA + sB). The Nash Bargaining
solution postulates that Alice should get her outside
option sA plus half the surplus; the other half should
go to Bob. In other words, Alice should get vA = sA +
∆/2 = (V + sA − sB)/2, while Bob should get vB =
sB + ∆/2 = (V + sB − sA)/2. Note that if Alice, for
instance, invests more than Bob (sA > sB), she should
get a larger portion of the treasure, which is arguably a
more fair allocation than just splitting V in two equal
shares.
Nash showed in 1950 that the previous allocation fol-
lows mathematically from a set of reasonable assump-
tions about the rationality of the two involved individ-
uals [22, 23]; this is an axiomatic theory because it
does not derive the Nash solution based on a model
of the actual bargaining process. The Nash solution is
Pareto-optimal and fair in the sense that it splits the
surplus equally between the two players.1 In 1986, Bin-
more, Rubinstein and Wolinsky modeled the bargain-
ing process between two players as a sequential non-
cooperative game, and they proved, under certain as-
sumptions, that the unique equilibrium is actually the
previous Nash solution (vA, vB) (namely, each player
gets her outside option plus half surplus) [3]. An im-
91There are also other notions of fair bargaining, such as
Kalai’s solution that maximizes the minimum payoff among
the two players.
portant condition behind this result is that the risk of
breakdown (i.e., the probability that Alice or Bob will
walk away from the negotiations even though sA+sB <
V ) is the same for both players and negligible.
2.2 Formulation
Suppose that two ASes, A and B, consider having a
direct interconnection between them. To argue quan-
titatively about the costs and benefits of this intercon-
nection, A and B need to be very specific about the
routes and traffic volume that will be going through
this interconnection as well as about its location and
capacity. Suppose for now that A and B are only ne-
gotiating for an interconnection at a specific exchange
point at which they are both present, and for a single
BGP route that A will export to B advertising reacha-
bility to a destination prefix D. Suppose that this traffic
volume is denoted by T . In the rest of this section, all
costs and payments refer only to T . We will consider
the more general case in Section 4.
In the absence of a direct interconnection, flow T is
routed through a different network path. For instance,
T could flow from B to a transit provider C and then
to A. This is the “outside option” of A and B. Let v′A
and v′B be the payoffs of A and B, respectively, when
they are not directly interconnected. If c′A is the cost
incurred by A for flow T in the outside option, we have
that v′A = −c
′
A; similarly for B, v
′
B = −c
′
B. The costs
c′A and c
′
B may represent, for instance, transit fees that
A and B need to pay to their common transit provider
C. In a more general case, in which the outside option
is associated with both costs and revenues, c′A or c
′
B
represent the net “costs minus revenues” amount and
they may even be negative.
If A and B reach an agreement, T will flow directly
from B to A. In general, there will be some costs cA and
cB, for A and B respectively, associated with this flow.
These terms can represent the internal costs of A and
B for carrying this traffic through their own infrastruc-
ture.
The surplus of the direct interconnection is
∆ = (c′A + c
′
B)− (cA + cB) (1)
Obviously the interconnection makes sense only if the
surplus is positive, ∆ > 0. According to the Nash solu-
tion, ∆ should be equally split between A and B. In the
general case, this can only happen if there is a payment
between the two players. To see that, consider the case
c′B−cB > c
′
A−cA, i.e., B benefits from the interconnec-
tion more than A. If so, the surplus can be split equally
between A and B if B pays a fee r > 0 to A, such that
r =
(c′B − cB)− (c
′
A − cA)
2
(2)
In that case, the benefit that B gets from the inter-
connection is equal to the benefit that A gets from the
2
interconnection because c′B−cB−r = c
′
A−cA+r. Then,
the payoff of A will be
vA = r − cA =
(c′B − c
′
A)− (cA + cB)
2
= v′A +
∆
2
(3)
and the payoff of B will be
vB = −r−cB =
(c′A − c
′
B)− (cA + cB)
2
= v′B+
∆
2
(4)
Note that (vA, vB) is the Nash solution.
It is easy to see that the payoff of each AS at the
Nash solution (vA and vB) is higher than its payoff at
the outside option (v′A and v
′
B , respectively) if and only
if ∆ > 0. So, with Nash-Peering both ASes are better
off compared to the outside option, even if one of them
has to pay the other.
If A benefits more from the interconnection than B
(c′B − cB < c
′
A − cA), the previous equations still hold
but for a negative payment r, i.e., A would need to pay
−r to B to obtain the Nash solution.
The previous simple equations describe the proposed
Nash-Peering interconnection framework. To summa-
rize, A and B should agree to directly interconnect if
and only if the surplus ∆ is positive because in that
case both of them will benefit. If B benefits more from
the interconnection than A then B should pay r to A,
where r is given by (2); otherwise A should pay −r to
B. It is important to note that the Nash-Peering frame-
work does not rely on any arbitrary conventions about
the direction of payment; it does not assume that the
sender of the traffic should always pay, for instance.
2.3 Remarks
The negotiation terms involve only the costs incurred
by A and B when the interconnection is not in place (c′A
and c′B) and when it is (cA and cB). These costs depend,
in general, on the location of the interconnection. For
example, if A is a US-based ISP and B is a European
ISP, interconnecting in New York would introduce lower
costs for A and higher costs for B than if they intercon-
nect in Amsterdam. Similarly, the previous costs are
route-dependent. For example, the cost of a transcon-
tinental route is higher than the cost of a route that
delivers the traffic in the same metro area. Or, the cost
of a route that goes through a transit provider is higher
than the cost of a local route.
The exposition so far assumed that A exports a route
to B and the latter sends the traffic volume T through
A. In practice, the interconnection will carry traffic in
both directions. If we apply the Nash-Peering frame-
work separately to each direction of the interconnection,
it could be that A has to pay a fee rAB to B and B has
to pay a fee rBA to A. The two ASes can then combine
the two payments into a single lump-sum payment.
Settlement-free peering is a special case of Nash-Peering
when c′B − cB = c
′
A− cA, i.e., when the interconnection
is equally beneficial to both ASes. Paid-peering, on
the other hand, may seem initially as similar to Nash-
Peering. This is not the case however for two reasons:
first, in paid-peering it is always the sender (typically a
content provider) that has to pay the receiver (typically
an access provider), and second, the price associated
with paid-peering may not be determined based on the
interconnection costs for the two ASes and the costs of
their outside options.
We should emphasize that Nash-Peering does not con-
sider the economic value of the information that is car-
ried by the traffic flow T (e.g., whether the traffic is
HBO premium content or whether it originates from
Google). Considering that economic value and trying to
somehow distribute it between the ASes that the traf-
fic goes through is a highly controversial subject and
is viewed by many as a violation of network neutrality
[10]. Nash-Peering does not do that – it only consid-
ers the costs incurred by the two ASes in carrying this
traffic through their infrastructure.
Equations (3) and (4) show that the utility of both
ASes increases with the surplus ∆. So, given a certain
outside option with costs c′A and c
′
B, both ASes have
the same incentive: to decrease their internal intercon-
nection costs cA and cB as much as possible. As long
as (cA + cB) is minimized, both A and B will split the
corresponding maximized surplus equally; the relative
magnitude of cA and cB does not matter.
What if the two ASes simplify their negotiations by
considering many routes simultaneously, and averaging
the underlying interconnection costs across all routes?2
This can be done in practice but it may result in loss
of economic efficiency. To see why, consider a simple
example with two routes. Suppose that the surplus for
route-1 is positive (∆1 = (c
′
A,1+c
′
B,1)−(cA,1+cB,1) > 0)
but the surplus for route-2 is negative. If the two ASes
negotiate for both routes at the same time, averaging
the corresponding cost parameters, it may be that the
aggregate surplus ∆ is positive. In that case the inter-
connection will be established, even though both A and
B would be better off if they had only interconnected
for route-1. Similarly, if ∆ < 0, they will not intercon-
nect even though they would be better off if they had
only considered route-1.
3. DISPUTES AND NASH-PEERING
In this section we briefly review some common types
of interconnection disputes (see [1] for a recent historical
analysis) and discuss how they would be resolved in the
Nash-Peering framework.
3.1 Access vs. Content providers
92Each route would be weighted based on the traffic vol-
ume it carries.
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Especially in the last few years, there are frequent
disputes between Access Providers (APs) and Content
Providers (CPs). The sf-Peering framework does not
allow these two types of ASes to negotiate their inter-
connection in a principled manner based on actual costs
and available alternatives. APs and CPs are very differ-
ent in terms of their traffic patterns: the former mostly
consume traffic while the latter mostly produce traffic,
meaning that any peering conditions based on traffic
ratios will obviously not be met. CPs often request
sf-Peering with APs (so that they both minimize up-
stream transit fees) while APs claim that CPs benefit
much more from such interconnections.
In the Nash-Peering framework, APs and CPs can
always interconnect if there is a mutual benefit for both
of them (positive surplus). For instance, in an actual
recent case between a major US ISP (Comcast) and a
major video provider (Netflix), the CP’s outside option
was to pay one or more transit providers (or CDNs)
while the AP’s outside option was to rely on one or more
sf-Peering links with those transit providers, suggesting
that c′CP ≫ c
′
AP . Further, if the interconnection(s)
between them would take place closer to the CP’s data
centers, it would also be that cAP ≫ cCP . In a scenario
like this, Nash-Peering specifies that the CP will have to
pay the AP for the interconnection. This payment may
be close to zero, or it may even be reversed (from the
AP to the CP), if the CP has its own backbone network
that delivers the traffic very close to the final “eyeballs”
(meaning that cAP ≈ cCP or even that cAP < cCP ),
while the outside option is equally expensive for both of
them (perhaps they both use the same transit provider,
with c′CP ≈ c
′
AP ).
3.2 The fallacy of traffic ratios
A second common dispute is between ISPs (transit or
access providers) that have established sf-Peering inter-
connections based on a traffic ratio constraint γ (i.e., A
and B peer if the traffic between them, TAB and TBA,
satisfies the constraint 1/γ < TAB
TBA
< γ, where γ is typ-
ically between 2 and 5). This condition, however, does
not have have any relevance to the economic benefits
of this interconnection for each party. It is possible
that the condition is not met, even though the inter-
connection’s surplus is positive, meaning that the two
ISPs would not establish an sf-Peering link even though
a Nash-Peering interconnection would be beneficial for
both of them. The opposite can also happen, if the sur-
plus is negative but the traffic ratio constraint is met.
The traffic ratio condition has its roots in the eco-
nomics of telephone networks where every long-distance
call would require roughly the same resources from the
two carriers. Nash-Peering replaces this constraint with
economic considerations that do not make any assump-
tions about the correspondence between economic value
or cost and the corresponding traffic flows.
3.3 Tier-1 “peering wars”
A third type of dispute arises due to the status of
some ASes as “Tier-1” (meaning that they do not have
any transit providers). In the current Internet, all Tier-
1 providers have to be interconnected with a full-mesh
of sf-Peering relations. The presence of such a clique re-
sults in a problematic state where existing Tier-1 providers
adopt highly restrictive peering policies in order to avoid
interconnecting with networks outside the clique (there
is no economic incentive for a network in the clique to
peer with a network outside the clique). Similarly, sup-
pose that an AS X is a member of the Tier-1 clique
but another AS Y claims that X no longer satisfies Y’s
peering criteria. If Y terminates the sf-Peering intercon-
nection with X, some ASes in the customer cone of Y
would be disconnected from some ASes in the customer
cone of X. This risk of network partitioning causes some
ASes to retain existing peering links even if they are no
longer beneficial to them.
In other words, the clique of Tier-1 providers is hard
to evolve and its static structure can cause disputes be-
tween incumbents and newcomers. In the Nash-Peering
framework, Tier-1 providers do not have any special
privilege (other than not having an upstream transit
provider). All their interconnections can be based on
Nash-Peering, instead of sf-Peering, and there would be
dynamic exchanges of money between them that change
in terms of amount and direction from month to month.
Further, a new entrant does not need to negotiate rigid
and restrictive peering policies, but can peer with any
member of the clique (possibly with a payment) as long
as it is mutually beneficial to do so.
3.4 Not all routes cost the same
Finally, we believe that the current interconnection
framework does not provide the right incentives for ISPs
to invest in high-cost routes that reach remote or sparsely
populated destinations such as rural regions. The main
issue is that the same transit price is typically applied on
all routes, independent of the cost associated with each
route. At the same time, intense competition forces all
transit providers to reduce their transit prices as much
as possible. So, an ISP does not have the incentive
to invest in the infrastructure that a high-cost route re-
quires, given that that route will not generate additional
revenue.
With Nash-Peering, on the other hand, the inter-
connection fees are determined based on the cost of a
route. If the cost cA of the route that A advertises to
B increases, while the three other parameters of the in-
terconnection (c′A, c
′
B, cB) are constant, the payment r
from B to A will also increase (as long as ∆ > 0). This
gives A the incentive to invest in high-cost routes that
4
would be under-provisioned today.
4. NASH-PEERING IN PRACTICE
So far, our exposition assumed that A and B will
agree to adopt the Nash solution, without considering
the actual bargaining process between them or the in-
formation they will need during that process. Here, we
explain how we envision Nash-Peering in a more prac-
tical context.
4.1 The bargaining process
A bargaining process between two rational players,
when modeled as a sequential game, converges to a
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium that is identical to
the Nash solution [3]. The mathematical assumptions
for this result (see Proposition-3) are reasonable and we
expect them to be true in practice (see Assumptions 1,
2, 8 and 9). The key condition is that the probability
that the negotiations between A and B will fail, even
though the surplus ∆ is positive, is the same for both
players and negligible. In other words, both players ne-
gotiate patiently and rationally, knowing that if they
manage to reach agreement they will mutually benefit
compared to their outside option. Considering impa-
tient or asymmetric players (e.g., A is an AS that des-
perately needs this interconnection, while B does not
care much about it) is an important question for future
research but outside the scope of this paper.
Based on the previous result of [3], we can assume
that the two ASes A and B will either directly agree
to adopt the Nash solution, as a normative statement
about how they should be sharing the costs of their in-
terconnection, or it is reasonable to expect that a bar-
gaining process between them will eventually result in
the Nash solution.
4.2 Interconnection parameters
Even if A and B agree to adopt the Nash solution,
what information will they need to have access to? The
Nash solution requires knowledge of cA, cB, c
′
A, and
c′B. We refer to these four terms as the interconnection
parameters: they represent the costs that are associated
with this traffic volume in the outside option (c′A, c
′
B),
and with the corresponding costs if that interconection
is actually established (cA, cB).
First, an AS should be able to estimate the inter-
connection parameters for its own traffic. The more
challenging question is how to estimate the correspond-
ing parameters of the other AS. Obviously, A should
not just trust B when the latter claims that its rele-
vant parameters are cB and c
′
B. Later in this section,
we describe an one-sided estimation process that would
allow A to estimate the parameters cB and c
′
B of AS
B, at least approximately. More generally, however,
we do not believe that these negotiations have to be
based entirely on one-sided estimated parameters. We
envision that when two ASes negotiate their intercon-
nection agreement they will be presenting quantitative
cost analyses to each other for the traffic they will be ex-
changing, allowing the other AS to verify claims about
the cost of the outside option or of the negotiated in-
terconnection.
4.3 The granularity of negotiations
In practice, the negotiations between A and B will
not need to consider each BGP route separately. First,
even though there are about half a million BGP routes
today, the vast majority of the traffic that is directly ex-
changed between two ASes is dominated by a relatively
small number of BGP routes [17]. For instance, if A is
Comcast and B is Google, the two ASes could focus on
the rather small number of routes that originate from
Comcast’s network, given that the vast majority of the
traffic in this interconnection would flow from Google
data centers to Comcast subscribers.
Second, we expect that the interconnection parame-
ters of large groups of routes will be roughly identical,
when considering a specific location. For instance, if A
is Cogent and B is Deutsche Telekom, and they con-
sider interconnecting in Frankfurt, most Cogent routes
for US-based destination networks would probably be
grouped together. On the other hand, Cogent routes for
Asia-based destination networks would probably be as-
sociated with different interconnection parameters, and
they would be negotiated as a different group of routes.
Also, these parameters would be different when Cogent
and Deutsche Telekom interconnect in Ashford VA, in-
stead of Frankfurt.
A quantitative analysis of how many groups of routes
would need to be negotiated separately, at a given in-
terconnection location and for a given pair of ASes, is
certainly an important question that we will investigate
in future work. It is clear though that negotiating large
bundles of routes with similar interconnection parame-
ters will significantly decrease the accounting complex-
ity of Nash-Peering.
4.4 One-sided parameter estimation
We assume that a network with complete knowledge
of its internal infrastructure can estimate its own inter-
nal costs (interconnect and backhaul), perhaps as pro-
posed by Motiwala et al. [21].
An AS also needs to estimate the internal costs and
outside options of its potential peers. To estimate the
outside option of B, the first option is for A to use BGP
and traceroute measurements from a route server in B’s
network, along with AS-relationship data [5], to infer
whether B’s path toward destination D is via a cus-
tomer, provider, or peer. A second option is to use AS
customer cone data [5] to infer whether B could reach
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prefix D using either customer or peer links. If B’s out-
side option is a provider, A can estimate B’s transit cost
using available transit pricing data.
To estimate B’s internal costs, A needs to know the
ingress and egress points into B’s network for the traf-
fic toward destination D. A can use traceroutes from
looking glass servers in B (or networks in B’s customer
cone), or the reverse traceroute system [16], to measure
the path towards D, and hence infer the ingress and
egress points into B’s network. Assuming symmetry of
cost factors, A can approximate B’s internal costs using
its own cost model and the ingress/egress points into
B’s network.
5. RELATED WORK
Dhamdhere et al. [9] proposed a value-based peer-
ing scheme that treats each interconnection as a paid-
peering link, where a payment is exchanged depending
on the “added value” that the interconnection offers to
each party. Courcoubetis et al. [8] have also applied the
theory of Nash bargaining to derive paid-peering prices
(specifically targeting the negotiation between content
and access providers) considering factors such as ad-
vertising revenues, subscriber loyalty, and interconnec-
tion or capacity costs. Jahn and Pru¨fer [15] analyzed
a model in which two ISPs with asymmetric sizes com-
pete for subscribers while at the same time they con-
sider paid-peering, based on Nash bargaining, as a way
to interconnect. They assume equal internal costs for
both ISPs and a variable transit fee charged by a single
transit provider. Besen et al. [2] analyzed the outcome
of Nash bargaining between two peers in the absence
of an outside option, which incurs service degradation,
and loss of customers and revenue. Nash-Peering dif-
fers from these earlier models in that the interconnec-
tion fees are determined based on costs rather than the
economic “value” of a flow (which is much harder to
measure – and rather controversial).
Valancius et al. [26] demonstrated that ISPs could
maximize transit profits by employing a tiered pricing
scheme, charging different prices for different routes –
they also showed that a small number of tiers would
be sufficient. Their scheme focuses on transit relations,
however, and does not involve price bargaining. MINT [25]
and Route Bazaar [4] are two schemes where“route sell-
ers” advertise connectivity for different path segments
and “route buyers” compose end-to-end paths by pur-
chasing connectivity over specific path segments. Route
Bazaar and MINT do not focus on the economics of how
the prices are set, or how prices relate to costs and out-
side options. Tan et al. [24] showed how providers
can establish interconnection agreements to dynami-
cally trade network capacity. This demonstrates how
“paid peering”can be employed to improve network uti-
lization and create incentives to improve infrastructure.
Prior research by Ma et al. [19, 20] employs coopera-
tive game theory to model multilateral interconnections
betweeen different types of networks in the Internet
ecosystem. They proposed the use of the Shapley Value
to achieve fair and stable division of surplus among dif-
ferent types of providers. Nash-Peering differs from that
approach in that it only requires bilateral contracts be-
tween ASes. Multilateral interconnection agreements
are much harder to establish and manage in practice.
From a policy standpoint, Faratin et al. [11] discuss
the emergence of paid peering, highlight the increased
complexity of the negotiations involved in peering, and
discuss the implications for telecommunications policy.
Clark et al. [6] analyzed the reasons why settlement-free
peering based on traffic ratios could make way for paid-
peering between CDNs and access ISPs. The authors
advocated increased transparency into costs, traffic pat-
terns, and interconnection terms over regulation of in-
terconnection. Economides and T˚ag [10] focus on net-
work neutrality regulation and demonstrate the effects
of regulation on the total surplus of peering relations.
6. DISCUSSION
Nash-Peering represents a major departure from the
current interconnection framework. Instead of the limit-
ing dichotomy of AS relations into transit and sf-Peering,
it offers a more general, efficient and fair framework
in which two ASes evaluate the economic benefits that
an interconnection would provide them, at the level of
groups of routes with similar costs, and split any poten-
tial surplus equally among them.
The next step in this research will be to examine the
Internet-wide effects of bilateral Nash-Peering intercon-
nections. For instance, a change in the interconnec-
tion between A and B may trigger changes in many
interdomain routes. The latter may affect the traf-
fic volume in other interconnections, between different
pairs of ASes, i.e., these bilateral interconnections have
network-wide externalities. Of course such externalities
are also present in the current interconnection frame-
work but Nash-Peering will probably introduce more
complex dynamics due to the finer granularity of bi-
lateral negotiations. Interestingly, the network exter-
nalities of bilateral contracts is also an active research
area in economic theory, and we plan to leverage that
emerging body of knowledge [13].
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